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NOTE AND COMMENT 
SIMPLIFICATION OF JUDICIAL PRoc£Duro: IN Ff:D£RAL CoUR'tS.-In 1914 the. 
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives unanimously re-
ported favorably upon a bill (H. R. 133) authorizing the Supreme Court of 
the United States to prescribe by rule the forms, kind and character of 
the entire pleading, practice and procedure to be used in all actions and 
proceedings at law in the federal courts, with a view to their '5implification, 
which rules should, when promulgated, take precedence of any law in con-
flict therewith. On January 2, 1917, a similar bill (S. 4551) was favorably 
reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee by a distinguished graduate 
of this Law School, Senator SuTHaLAND. The concurrence of the Judiciary 
Committees of the two houses of Congress gives promise of an early en-
actment of this legislation. 
While many other activities of Congress have attracted more attention 
than this effort to promote uniformity in federal court procedure, it is 
doubtful whether any will have more far-reaching beneficent consequences. 
The purpose of the so-called ''UNIFORMITY Ac:r" of 1872 (R. S. 9I4), was 
to save the bar from the double burden of two systems of procedure in law 
cases, one State and the other federal. Such an eventuality was one which 
the profession might well hope to escape. But in practice it was found that 
real uniformity was impossible. The loophole provided by the language 
"as near as may be" was more and more resorted to by the federal courts 
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to avoid conformity with local rules of practice which did not seem just 
and reasonable, with the result that an immense number of precedents for 
non-conformity have been established, destroying to a large extent the very 
uniformity in procedure which it was the purpose of the Ar:r to establish. 
On the surface, the proposed regulation of federal procedure by the Su-
preme Court aims only to recognize the actual divergence between State and 
federal practice and to improve the latter in a systematic fashion. This 
would be a great gain in itself, for the present hybrid practice in the federal 
courts is intrinsica11y unsatisfactory' and ·creates confusion as between the 
various federal districts. 
But the real effect of a uniform system of federal practice would almost 
certainly be far greater than this. The States have been groping about 
more or less blindly for seventy years trying to reform procedure. The 
early promise of the Fmr.n Cons has not been fu1fi11ed. The ".Cons" is in 
large measure a failure. Statutory modifications of the common law sys-
tem have been tried again and again with indifferent success. They alt 
failed in the most vital place,-they were fixed and mandatory legislative 
enactments imposed upon the courts, instead of rules •by which the courts 
guided their own efforts to do justice to litigants. In a few conspicuous in-
stances, such as New Jersey in 1912, Colora.do in 1913, and Virginia in 1916, 
the States themselves have taken up the court-rule system of procedure, 
but progress has been exceedingly slow. 
If, now, the Congress of the United States approves the court-rule plan, 
and it is put into effect with the wisdom and ability which we have the 
right to expect from the United States Supreme Court, the movement for 
reform along this tine, so successfu11y pursued in England and Canada, wi11 
gain enormous force and prestige, and it wi11 ·very likely become the dom-. 
inant system among our States. But more than that may confidently be 
expected. An effective system of court rules wi11 be put into operation in 
the federal courts sitting in each State, and that system will undoubtedly 
tend to become the model for the systems which may be looked for in the 
several States. The merit of the federal Supreme Court rules ought to be 
enough !o commend them genera11y, but the great additional advantage to 
accrue from identity of procedure in the State and federal courts will exert 
a sti11 more powerful influence. · 
Procedure thus seems to enjoy a unique position in the United States. 
It is the only subject of legislation over which the federal authorities have 
fu11 coordinate jurisdiction with the States, and it offers the only oppor-
tunity for a federal system to serve as a model for State adoption. So that 
procedure, which has lagged so long and suffered so many vicissitudes, bids 
fair to become one of the pioneers of uniformity. E. R. S. 
WHAT WoRDs CRSA'rr: A Pown?-As the right to sell may exist either 
as.,.a result of ownership, or by virtue of a power without or independent 
of ownership, it is sometimes a question whether words indicating a right 
to se11, contained in an instrument granting an estate, are intended to give 
a.power, or are merely descriptive of the rights incident to the estate given. 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
When property is devised without any designation of the estate given, and 
the devise is followed by words indicating that the devisee is to have the 
right of absolute disposal in fee, or to sell in fee, it has often been held 
that the words indicating an absolute power of disposal show that the 
devisee was intended by the testator to have an estate in fee, not a life 
estate with a testamentary power of appointing the reversion. (See note 18 
L. R. A. N. S. 463.) If the devise were e..'Cpressly of an estate for life, no 
such inference could be indulged; and it would have to be held that the 
right of disposal given was merely a testamentary power to appoint the re-
version. 
Again, it has happened that testators have given estates expressly for 
life only, with vague words as to the right of disposal, putting the court 
into a quandary as to whether the testator was speaking of a testamentary 
power or of the right of disposal incidental to ownership of a, life estate. 
Thus in the case of Bradly v. Westcott (18o7), 13 Ves. 445, it was held 
by Sir WM. GRANT, M. R., that the following words indicated not a testa-
mentary power in addition to the life estate, but merely freedom from bond 
and accountability for use: After minor bequests and direction to pay debts, 
the testator gave all his moneys, stocks, household goods, and other personal 
property to his wife, Elizabeth, "for and during the term of her natural 
life; to be at her full, free, and absolute disposal and disposition during her 
natural life, without being in any wise liable to be called to account of or 
concerning the amount, value, or particulars thereof, by· any person or per-
sons whomsoever; and from and after her decease" he gave what she should 
be possessed of at the time of her death to others. Many cases of this sort 
are to be found in the books. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co. (1876), 93 U. S. 
326, on , the following words : "I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, 
Nancy Sinclair, all my estate, both real and personal, to have and to hold 
during her natural life, and to do with as she sees proper before her death." 
But in rendering the opinion, Mr. Justice FlllLD, after reviewing Bradly v. 
Westcott, and similar cases, declared: "Numerous other cases to the same 
purport might be cited. They all show, that where a power of disposal ac-
companies a bequest or devise of a life-estate, the power is limited to such 
disposition as a tenant for liJe can make, unless there are other words 
clearly indicating that a larger power was intended." In other words, that 
a power of disposal given to a life tenant is no power at all, unless the 
words used indicate that the life-tenant was to have greater powers of dis-
posal ·over the property than a life estate gives. With deference to this 
great judge, it is submitted that the cases cited show nothing of the sort. 
It may be true that the fact that the person claiming the power is by the same 
instrument given an estate, from which a certain right of disposal results, 
may require clearer words to create a power to him than if no estate were 
given him. But the books are full of cases in which an estate e..'Cpressly 
for life, with power of sale or disposal, have been held to give power to 
sell in fee, indeed, that is the only rational as well as the usual construe-
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·tion.1 Powers to life tenants have often been implied merely from gift over 
of "what remains."" 
•Lewis v. Palmer (1878), 46 Conn. 454, was a devise to a sister "during her natural 
life, and for her to dispose of as she may think proper, right or just; and I do hereby 
give power and authority to my executrix to sell real or personal property as she may 
think best to make my estate clear from debt." Who was executrix does not appear, 
nor that the life tenant sold to pay debts; but the court after discussing several cases 
as to construction of powers of disposal to life tenants held that the right to sell in 
fee was to be presumed. 
In Bouton v. Doty (1897), 6g Conn. 531, 39 Atl. 1064, a power to mortgage the 
fee was held to be included in a reservation by deed to the grantor of a life estate 
"with full power to mortgage said premises to raise money for my own personal bene· 
fit at any time I may desire for and during my natural life." To the same effect is 
Security Co. v. Pratt (1894), 65 Conn. 161. 
Wood v. Owen (1910) 133 Ga. 751, 66 S. E. g.51 holds that a power to sell in 
fee was given by a devise to a wife "without limitation or reserve, for her to do 
as she thinks best" for herself and his children, "and I make Archa M. Wood equal 
with the rest of my heirs.'' 
Simpkins v. Bales (1904), 123 Iowa 62, g8 N. W. 58<>, holds that title in fee simple 
passed by the deed of the widow to whom testator devised property "to be used and 
enjoyed and disposed of as seemeth the best to her, during her natural life or so long 
as she remains'my widow," and after her death to his children. 
Hamilton v. Hamilton (1910), 149 Iowa 321, 128 N. W. 380. 
In Fink v. I,eisman (1896), 18 Ky. !,. Rep. 71<>, 38 S. W. 6, a power to sell in 
fee was held given by a gift by will to testator's wife of all his "personal, mixed, and 
real estate property during her lifetime, with full power and authority to sell property 
if she sees proper.'' . . 
Bodfish v. Bodfish (1909), 105 Me. 166, 73 Atl. 1033, discusses the implication of a 
power to sell in fee to the widow to whom the estate expressly fJr life was given in 
the absence of any declaration that she might sell, holding there was no warrant for 
such implication -on the facts. But such a power was found in Young v. Hillier (191>7), 
103 Me. 17, 67 At!. 571. 
Cummings v. Shaw (1871), 108 Mass, 159, holds that power to pass a fee was given 
by a devise "for and during his natural, with right to dispose of the same.'' 
Woodbridge v. Jones (1903), 183 Mass. 553, 67 N. E. 879, was a devise and be-
quest of residue real and personal "to my wife during her life, to use and dispose of 
the same as she may think proper, with remainder thereof on her decease, one-third 
to the heirs of my brother," &c.; and the court held a power to sell in fee was given 
the wife. 
In Hoxie v. Finney (1888), 147 Mass. 
0
616, 18 N. E. 593, a sale in fee reserving to 
herself a life estate was held authorized by the words: "I do give and bequeath to her 
the use and improvement of my whole estate, both real and personal, with liberty to 
use and appropriate so much of the principal, in addition to the income as she may 
deem necessary for her comfort and support ; and I authorize her to sell and dispose 
of the whole or any part of my real and person estate at her discretion." 
Gaven v. Allen (1889), lOO Mo. 293, 13 S. W. 501, was a devise and bequeath of 
residue to a wife without words of limitation, making her and another executors, and 
adding: "My will is that my said wife shall or will not dispose of my aforementioned 
fee simple and leasehold property without the written consent to the same of my 
brother"; and it was held she had a power to sell in fee. 
Griffin v. Nicholas (1909), 224 Mo. 275, 123 S. W. 1063, was a devise to a wife 
"to have and to hold and enjoy for and during her natural life, with full power to 
make such disposal thereof as may be necessary for her own comfort and support"; 
an'a. the court held it was a power to sell in fee, saying: "The words conferring the 
power wouid be idle if they only meant that she could' sell her life estate." 
Parks v. Robinson (1905), 138 N. C. 26g, so S. E. 649, holds that the objection 
that plaintiff could not convey title in fee according to the contract sued on was not 
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well taken, plaintiff claiming under a devise by her husband "to my beloved wife, 
Ann Parks, during her natural life and at her disposal"; and after reviewing several 
cases the court mentioned Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., saying, "We arc of opinion 
that the more reasonable view, certainly where there is no limitation over, is found in 
the decisions of this and other courts which we have cited." 
Bishop v. Remple (186o), II Ohio St. 277, was a decision that a power to sell in 
fee was given by the words: "I give, devise, and bequeath to my beloved wife, Elizabeth, 
all and singular my goods and property as may remain after all claims against my 
estate are satisfied, with full power to have and to hold, to sell and convey the same 
during the term of her natural life," and "after her death any moneys or effects of my 
estate that may remain," etc. 
Forsythe v. Forsythe (1884), 108 Pa. St. 129, was a devise of all property real and 
personal to wife "during her natural life, with power to dispose of the same as she 
may .think best"; and it was held that her absolute disposition by will was authorized. 
Shields v. Netherland (1880), 13 Tenn. (5 I.ea) 193, was a devise of land to a 
daughter and her husband "to dispose of as they may think proper," followed by a 
codicil declaring, "it is not my intention to make the estate a fee simple" if the bus· 
band survives; but they "shall have power during their joint lives, to dispose of the 
lands devised to them, by deed executed by them jointly," etc.; and this was held 
to be a power to sell in fee absolute. 
White v. White (1849), 21 Vt. 250, holds that power to sell in fee was given by 
a devise to the wife "to have at her disposal during her natural life or so long as 
she remains my widow." 
Englerth v. Keller (1901), 50 \V. Va. 266, 40 S. E. 468, was a devise of residue 
after paying debts, to wife "to be enjoyed by her during her natural life, but if at 
any time she may wish she shall be at liberty of selling a portion of the real estate 
that she may think to her interest, and in that case her conveyance shall be valid"; 
and the court after reviewing the decisions declared that a power to a life tenant to 
sell, means in fee, wherefore her deed in fee was good. 
Wood v. Amidon (1875), 2 MacArthur (D. C.) 224, holding a life estate and 
power to sell in fee passed by devise to wife for life, she to pay debts, raise children, 
and to give them portions on becoming of age, and to do with the estate as she may 
think best for herself and the children. 
Schreiner v. Smith (1889), as Fed. 897, was a devise of all property real and per· 
sonal to a wife, "to have and to hold during her natural life unless she marry. • • • 
The personal estate, before such marriage she may dispose of as ber necessities may 
-require." This was held to enable the widow to dispose of the personal property abso· 
lutely without liability to account for the proceeds. 
2 A gift of "what may remain" after the death of the life tenant does not imply 
a power in the life tenant if any of the property given is perishable or liable to di· 
minish by use: Bramell v. Cole (1896), 136 Mo. 201, 31 S. \V. 924, 58 Am. St. 619; 
Thompson v. Adams (1903), 205 !IL 552, 6g N. E. 1; Hunter v. Hunter (1900), 58 
S. C. 382, 36 S. E. 734, 79 Am. St. 845; Herring v. Williams (19n), 158 N. C. 1, 73 
S. E. 218, reviewing numerous cases. 
In Clark v. Middlesworth ( 1882), 82 Ind. 240, a power to sell in fee was held 
implied by a devise to testator's wife "during her life, and at her death if anything 
should remain, the same to be divided among my heirs·at·law.!' Approved in Downie 
v. Buennagel (1883), 94 Ind. 228, 234; Cushman's Estate (1890), 134 Ill. 88, 24 N. E. 
963; Foudray v. Foudray (1909), 44 Ind. App. 444, 89 N. E. 499. 
To the same effect: Harris v. Knapp (1839), 39 Mass. (21 Pick.), 412; Ramsdell v. 
Ramsdell (1842), 21 Me. 288. 
\Venger v. Thompson (1905), 128 Iowa 750, 105 N. \V. 333, holds a gift to wife 
for her own use for life and to educate and maintain his children, and after her death 
all the property then remaining in her possession, or the proceeds to be divided, gives 
her a power to sell in fee. 
Young v. Hillier (1907), 103 Me. 17, 67 At!. 571, holds that a gift over of what 
may remain on the death of the tenant for life, implied such a power in the life tenant 
.as enabled her to sell in fee whereby the remainder was defeated. 
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That Mr. Justice Fnir.n's doctrine has no acceptance in the older cases and 
is unknown in England, is vouched from never noticing it in a considerable 
reading, failure to discover it by careful search of texts that should men-
tion such a doctrine if there be one, and by the very explicit recognition of 
the opposite and more sensible rule, as illustrated in the case of Vivian v. 
Jegon (1868), L. R. 3 House of Lords Rep. 285. In this case the testator 
gave certain property to trustees to pay debts, &c., and other real estate 
to his daughter during the ter~ of her life without impeachment for waste, 
declaring "it sha11 be lawful for my said daughter to work, or contract for, 
lease, or .set out to be worked" mines then known or later discovered, the 
net proceeds therefrom to be paid to the trustees and invested, the income 
to be paid to the daughter for life. The daughter ma4e a mining lease for 
tweµty-one years and died a few months later. For the lessee it was argued: 
"It could not have been intended to be restricted to the granting of a lease 
for life. That would be contrary to the practice of law and the object of the 
testator. A gift of an estate for life carries with it the power to make 
a lease for life, and the addition to the gift of the estate of a power of leas-
ing, if intended to be restricted in this way would be perfectly needless, for 
every tenant for life may aliene the estate for his own life. When, there-
fore, the power is added to the gift of the estate, the fair construction is 
that the power is something different from and in excess of that which would 
·have arisen as a mere accessory to the gift of an estate for life. Hele v. 
Green (1651), 2 Roll. Abr. 261, pl. 10, expressly recognized the principle, and 
declared that where there was a general power to a tenant for life to grant a 
term, the grant of a term beyond this life was good, though it might de-
feat the remainders over." In rendering his opinion in the case, Lord 
Chance11or CAIRNS said in part: ''It is quite obvious that the power to the 
daughter to work the mines is a powet which cannot be exercised after her 
death. It must be ~ power co-extensive with- her own life. It would ~e 
somewhat singular, therefore, to find that one of the verbs here used should 
point to a benefit terminating so far as the daughter is concerned with her 
life; whereas another, the verb 'lease' should extend beyond her life to an 
indefinite period of time. But beyond these observations, I think there are 
in the latter part of this sentence, matters which indicate, beyond all doubt 
that what was here provided for was to take place in the lifetime of the 
daughter. The circumstances which, to my mind, are quite conclusive, are 
these: In the first place there is the provision that 'all the issues and neat 
proceeds and profits arising therefrom shall from time to time, as the same 
sha11 arise, be paid over by my said daughter to my said trustees and their 
heirs.' * * * And the only force, in fact which I myself felt in the argu-
ment of the appellant at your Lordship's bar, was this: It was contended· 
that if you give an estate to A for life, and then give a general undefined 
power of leasing to A, inasmuch as the gift of the life estate would carry 
wi.th it a power of leasing limited to the life of the tenant for life, the donee 
of the power; therefore, it was said it must be a necessary inference that in 
giving to the tenant for life. a power to lease, a lease was meant going be-
Y,ond the life incumbency." Lord CRANWORTH fotlowed, saying in part: "My 
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Lords, I entirely concur in what my noble and learned friend has said, and 
I have very tittle to add. Had this power been simply a power to lease 
and work the mines there would have been (as my noble and learned friend 
has suggested) great force in the argument that something must have been 
intended more than the daughter would have had by virtue of her life in-
terest. But that is not the object of this power. It is not so much a power 
as a restriction. What the testator says is this: If by virtue of your life 
interest you work these mines, mind I do not mean that you are to have 
the profits; whatever you get by so doing must be invested for the benefit 
of the fee simple of the estate. I think this is clearly what was meant. 
Without going the length of saying that, if the power of leasing the mines 
had been given simpliciter, without saying for how long, no case could 
arise in which you might say that it meant for ninety-nine years, at all 
events it must be an extreme case to enable you to come to such a result, 
and put such a construction on the words. But there is no necessity at all for 
it her-e." 
Nevertheless, this dictum of Mr. Justice FIEI.D, wholly uncalled for by 
the facts of the case before the court, has in a number of later cases been 
accepted and acted on where the application of such a rule defeated the 
clearly expressed intention of the testator, illustrating how unnecessary dicta 
often produce bad law. The dictum is quoted in the following cases: Giles 
v. Little (1881), 104 U. S. 291, holding "to be and remain hers, with full 
power, right, and authority to dispose of the same as to her shall seem 
meet and proper so l~ng as she shall remain" my widow," did not give a 
•This doctrine is recognized in Kaufman v. Bredkenridge (1886), II7 Ill. 305, 
7 N. E. 666, but power to sell in fee was found in the context: 'Dickinson v. Griggs· 
ville Nat. Bk., III Ill. App. I83, affirmed, 209 IIL 350; Wardner v. Seventh Day 
Baptist, etc. (I908), 232 Ill. 606, 83 N. E. Io8o, I22 Am. St. I38. 
Smith v. Bell (I832), 3I U. S. (6 Peters) 68, cited and relied on by Mr. Justice 
Field in Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., and from which he probably got the idea stated 
in his proposition was a bequest of all personal estate, principally five slaves, to a 
wife "to and for her own use and disposal absolutely; the remainder after her decease 
to be for the use" of an only son. The only question discussed was whether the gift 
over to the son was void as repugnant to the absolute gift to the wife. No idea of a 
power was suggested: Marshall, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court said: "There 
were trifling and perishable articles, such as the stock on the farm, and the crops 
of the year, which would be consumed in the use, and over which the exercise of 
absolute ownership was necessary to a full enjoyment. These may have been •in the 
mind of the testator, when he employed the strong words of the bequest to her. But 
be that as it may, we think the limitation to the son on the death of the wife restrains 
and limits the preceding words so as to confine the absolute power of disposition 
which they purport to confer of the slaves, to such a disposition of them as may be 
made by a person having only a life estate." 
Smith v. Mcintyre (I899), 95 Fed. 585, 37 C. C. A. 177, 'fi'as a devise of the 
homestead to the wife for life in lieu of dower, and the personalty to the wife for life, 
"she, however, first disposing of sufficient thereof to pay my just debts"; and it was 
held the power was not confined to the personalty; and that she could sell the home 
in fee. 
Cowell v. South Denver Real Est. Co. (1901), 16 Col. App. n8, 63 Pac. 994, 
merely holds that an explicit power to convey in fee given to the widow made tenant 
for life and executrix was not well exercised bedluse no purpose of the will required 
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pow.er to the widow; Henderson v. Blackburn (I882), I04 !ii. 227, 44 Am. 
Rep. 78o, holding "to have and to hold or to dispose of so much of the same 
as she may need or wish to use during her life time" and "after her death 
if there is anything left" gave her no power beyond her express life estat~; 
Patty v. Goolsby (I888), SI Ark. 6I, 9 S. W. &¢,holding the power extended 
only to the personal property, under the gift of "all my negroes, lands, stock" 
( &c.) "to have and to hold during her natural life, or until she may think 
proper to marry, :with full power to sell and dispose of such property as she 
may think proper"; Miller v. Porterfield (I8go), 86 Va. 876, II S. E. 486, 
I9 Am. St. 9I9, holding that no power was given by the words "to have 
and to hold the same for her own use and ibenefit, and also to make such 
disposition of the same that she in her judgment may deem best, should it 
become necessary that a part or all should become necessary for the support 
of herself," and "After the death of the said Elizabeth, I wt11 and devise that 
any and all property remaining unused shall be given" &c.; and now comes 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina to add to the list of fatalities created 
by this dictum by deciding, after quoting it as above, and without even men-
tioning numerous prior decisions of the South Carolina court, including 
Franty v. Franty (I833), I Bailey Eq. 5I7, to the contrary on like facts, that 
no power is given by the words: 'IMy wife, Jane, to have the right to dis-
pose of any property as she may think best for the purpose of paying all 
just debts and supporting herself and children while she remains my widow''; 
and this merely because a previous clause of the will gave her a life estate 
in all his property. Sheffield v. Graig (I9I6), - S. C. -, 8g S. E. 664 
' J.R R 
WHAT 0BI.IGATIONS Alls !NCI.UDE!> IN TH:e D£SCRII'TION 011' "IMPLIED CoN-
TRAC'l'S ?''-This question arose in the case of People v. Dummer, u3 
N. W. 934 recently decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The state 
had brought suit in debt in the Municipal Court of Chicago against the de-
fendant for taxes alleged to be due from him. By statute the municipal 
court was given jurisdiction over all actions on contracts, express or im-
it (payment of debts or the like), but the court does cite the case of Brant v. Virginia 
Coal Co. with apparent approval. 
Whittemore v. Russell (1888), So Me. 297, 14 Atl. 197, holds that a power is not 
given Qnyone by the following words because it is not said who shall sell: "I give 
to my wife the use of the remainder * * • during her natural lifetime, and after 
her decease it is to be equally divided between my children; the real estate may be 
sold if thought advisable." 
Russell v. Werntz (1898), 88 Md. 210, 44 Atl. 219, sheds no light on the present 
discussion because the court and counsel discussed only the question as to whether the 
devisee took an estate in fee by a devise to her "to hold and dispose of as he may 
see fit while she remains single." But very strict interpretation of language giving 
powers in this state is indicated in the later case of Bauernschmidt's Est. (1903), 97 
Md. 35, 54 Atl. 637, and Meister v. Meister (1913), 121 Md. 440, 88 Atl. 225. 
''Winchester v. Hoover (1902), 42 Ore. 313, 70 Pac. 1036, contatns no power to the 
life tenant; it is "to have and to hold during her life, or while she shall remain unmar· 
ried, to pay my debts, to support herself, and to maintain and educate minor children"; 
but the court does quote and approve the dictum of,Mr. Justice Field above quoted. ' 
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plied, when the amount claimed by the plaintiff, exclusive of costs, ex-
ceeded $1,000.00. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground 
that the court had no jurisdiction, inasmuch as the cause of action was 
deemed not to ·be based on a contract express or implied. 
It is plain that if the court was entitled to jurisdiction over the case, it 
was for the reason that the cause of action was based on implied con-
tract, for it could hardly be said that the obligation to pay a tax arises out 
of an express contract. It is also clear that the contract, if implied' at all1 
must have been implied in law and not in fact, for there were no acts or 
words of the taxpayer from which an actual intention to pay could have 
been presumed. The intention of the legislature must govern in determin-
ing what is included in the term "implied contract." That intention can be 
gathered by considering· what is generally meant by the term as used by 
writers and courts. Does it mean a contract in fact, that is, one based on 
consent implied from words or acts, or doe5 it include, in addition to the 
above, all non-contractual obligations which are treated for the· purpose 
of affording a. remedy as if they were contracts? Or does the term in-
clude, besides contracts in fact, only that group of non-contractual obliga-
tions founded on "unjust enrichment," technically called quasi-contracts? 
On the precise point involved in the suit for taxes in the principal case, 
there seems to have been little, if any, adjudication. However, some light 
may be thrown on the problem by considering the same question as it has 
arisen in connection with the jurisdiction of the United States Court of 
Claims. By the Act of Congress of February, 1855, that court was given 
jurisdiction over "* * * all claims founded * * * upon any contract, ex-
press or implied, with the government of the United States * * * " It has 
been held quite precisely that the "implied contract" of the statute includes 
only those in fact, that is, those implied from ,the acts or words of the 
parties, the mutual consent being presumed from conduct rather than ex-
pressed. Schillinget"s Case, 24 C. C. Rep. 278; Russell v. United States, 35 
C. C. Rep. 154; Harley v. United States, 39 C. C. Rep. 105; Knapp v. United 
States, 46 C. C. Rep. 6or. These decisions hold conclusively that "implied 
contract" does not includ'e contracts implied in law, that is, neither quasi-
contracts nor any other obligations which are contractual only from the 
viewpoint of the remedy available for their enforcement. 
The preceding discussion would seem to support absolutely the ruling in 
the principal case but for one consideration. The Illinois court in interpret-
ing the statute, stated that the term in question had been extended to in-
clude "a class of obligations which are created by law without regard to the 
assent of the party upon whom the obligation is imposed, on the ground that 
they are dictated by reason and justice." Yet the court refused to extend 
it to the case of an obligation to pay a tax. The term as defined so as to 
include quasi-contracts in the narrow sense, that is, "unjust enrichment" 
cases, is supported by authorities. Chudnovski v. Eckels, 232 Ill. 3r2; Harty 
Bros. v. Polakow, 237 Ill. 559;. Pache v. Oppenheim, 87 N. Y. Supp. 704; 
Devery v. Winton Motor Carriage Co., 97 N. Y. Supp. 392. Two things are 
of interest in connection with the Illinois cases, cited supra, allowing this 
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form of jurisdiction over quasi-contracts. In Chudnovski v. Eckels, the court 
quotes Br.ACKSTON:£, 3 CoMM. 158, to show that the term "implied contract" 
includes what is called a contract implied in law. However, the court seems 
to have overlooked the fact that the learned writer in that very portion 
of his work included a tax in the same category, as is evidenced by the fact 
that he used a statutory obligation as one ~mple of implied contract. In 
the case of Harty Bros. v. Polakow, the action was based on a statutory lien, 
a mere duty or obligation, as it were, and jurisdiction was taken with im-
plied contract as the basis. Several well considered cases outside of Illinois 
have held that a tax is an obligation based on an implied contract. State of 
Nevada v. Y. J.M. Co., 14 Nev. 220; City of Dubuque v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 
39 Iowa 56. 
It is evident, then, that the Illinois court defines "implied contract" as 
more extensive than contract implied in fact, but not so extensive as to in-
clude all non-contractual obligations termed contract for the sake of the 
remedy only. Why should there be a middle course? "The term 'quasi-
contracts' may with propriety be applied to all non..contractual obligations 
which are treated for the purpose of affording a remedy as if they were 
contracts. So interpreted, the subject includes: cl) judgments and other 
so-called contracts of record; (2) ~ number of official and.statJltory obliga-
tions * * * ; (3) .obligations arising from 'unjust enrichment,'-that is, the 
receipt by one person from another of a benefit the retention of which is 
unjust. But in view of the fact that nearly all of the obligations included 
in the first two classes are co~monly known and treated under more specifi~ 
designations, or as parts of other clearly defined topics, while those of the 
third class have no other distinctive name whatever, it is believed that the 
term 'quasi-contracts,' for the sake of convenience, should ordinarily be ap-
plied to obligations of the tli,ird class only." WOODWARD, LAw OF QuAs1-CoN-
'l'RAC'tS, I. There is a great deal to be said in making the criterion of juris-
diction one of remedy or form rather than one of substance, for then a 
court can determine whether it has jurisdiction by merely examining the 
most general pleadings. And this in spite of the position taken by the United 
States Court of Claims. However, there can ·be little justification for tak-
ing jurisdiction over one obligation which is contractual only for remedy's 
sake, and refusing to take Jurisdiction over another similar non-contractual 
obligation which can be enforced by a contractual remedy. The Illinois 
court, in order to be thoroughly consistent with its rulings in preVious cases, 
which carried jurisdiction over contracts into the realm of quasi-contractual 
obligations, should have held that the Chicago Municipal Court had jurisdic-
tion of the cause of action in the principal case. H. G. G. 
CoNsTITuTioNAI, A11u~NDM:£NTS, SaF-ExtcuTING AND OTRERWist, PBO-
~ING FOR TR~ INITIATIVt AND ~tRtNDUM.-The question of whether or 
n~f a provision of a state constitution, which provided that amendments 
thereto might be made by initiative petition, was self-ex~cuting, was pre-
sented to the Supreme Court of North Dakota in the recent case of State 
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ex rt?l. Linde, Atty. Gen. et al. v. Hall, Secretary of State, 1S9 N. W. 281. 
'North Dakota, at the -same time it adopted the initiative for constitutional 
amendments, also changed its constitution so as to permit of the initiative 
and referendum upon questions of general legislation; but the constitutional 
provision pertaining to this expressly stated that it was intended to be self-
executing and thus the question here presented did not arise in the construc-
tion of the amendment pertaining to the iI!itiative and referendum upon 
general legislation. Oregon, Oklahoma, Missouri, Arkansas, Washington, 
California, Colorado, Arizona, South Dakota, New Mexico, and Nevada have 
also at different times provided for the initiative and referendum through 
constitutional provisions. Of these constitutional provisions, some were 
clearly stated to be self-executing; whlte others were so worded as to make 
it evident that it was not intended that they should be self-executing, but 
rather that they should be construed as mandates to the legislatilres of the 
respective states, who, acting thereunder, should pass laws effectuating and 
putting into force the principles thus set forth. However, there is a third 
class, of which Hall v. State is typical, wherein the constitutio~al provision 
was so worded as to throw doubt upon its purpose and render a judicial 
determination necessary. 
A terse way of -summing up the distinction between self-executing pro-
visions and those which are not, is·to say that self-executing proyisions are 
addressed to the courts while those that are not are addressed to the legis-
latures. Willis v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140, so N. W. IIIO, 16 L. R. A. :281, 31 
Am. St. Rep. 626; State v. Kyle, 166 Mo. 287, 6S S. W. 763, s6 L. R. A. us. 
Constitutional provisions are "self-executing where it is the manifest inten-
tion that they should: go into effect and no ancillary legislation is necessary 
to the enjoyment of a right given or the enforcement of a duty or liability 
imposed." State v. Harris, 74 Ore. S73, 144 Pac. 109; State v. Swan, l N. D. 
s, 13, 44 N. W. 492. In other :words, the constitutional provision must ~e 
regarded as self-executing if an examination and construction of the pro-
vision itself will disclose the rights conferred or the duties imposed. How-
ever, if merely general principles are laid down, and the legislature must 
supplement the constitutional provision by passing laws to effectuate its 
purpose, then it is not self-executing. 
Oregon in 1902 amended its constitution so as to permit the initiative and 
referendum, providing for a general reservation by the people of the power 
to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject 
the same at the polts, and also the power to approve or reject at the polls 
any act of the legislative ·assembly. It not being evident whether or not 
the amendment was intended to be self-executing, the court was calted upon 
to construe the following portion: "Petitions and orders for the initiative 
and referendum shall be filed with the Secretary of State, and in submitting 
the same to the people he, and all other officers, shall be guided by the gen-
eral laws and the act submitting this amendment until legislation shalt be 
especialty provided for." The court construed the provision to be self-
executing, considering that the purpose was to insure the enforcement of 
the provision through its own strength and not to make its efficacy depend-
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ent upon some :future action on the part of the legislature, lest its effect 
be thwarted by the refusal by the legislature to obey its mandates. The 
court considered that the reference to future legislation was an acknowl-
edgment that it might be advisable to enact laws to facilitate the enforce-
ment of this constitutional provision, but that a provision may still ·be self-
executing though not so complete as to render supplemental legislation un-
necessary. Stevens v. Benson, 50 Ore. 26g, 91 Pac. 577. The initiative and 
referendum were still further extended in Oregon by a constitutional pro-
vision which provided for the initiative and referendum as to municipal leg-
islation, the amendment reading that "the manner of exercising said powers 
shall be prescribed by general laws." In construing this amendment, the 
court came to the opinion that it was not self-executing, as "it only declares 
or reserves the right, without laying down rules by means of which this right 
may be given the force of law." Long v. City of Portland, 53 Ore. 92, g8 
Pac. 149. 
The Oklahoma provision as to the initiative and referendum had pro-
vided that "the legislature shall make suitable provisions for carrying into 
effect the provisions of this article." The court had no difficulty in determin-
ing that the intention of the constitutional convention had been that this 
should be construed only as a mandate to the Legislature, and· giving ef-
fect to this intention, it was declared not to be self-executing. E~ parte 
Wagner, 21 Okla. 33, 95 Pac. 435. 
The provision .in the Missouri constitution was very similar to that one 
discussed in Stevens v. Benson, 50 Ore. 26g, supra, and the Missouri court 
assumed the same to be self-executing. Edwards v. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410, 
31 L. R. A. 815. The Arkansas provision upon the subject was borrowed 
from the Oregon constitution, and the Oregon court in Stevens v. Benson, 
supra, having deter1pined the same to be self-executing, the Arkansas court 
did likewise, (State v. Moore, 103 Ark. 48, 145 S. W. 199) doubtless having 
regard for the general rule that where one state borrows a constitutional 
provision from another state that has previously been construed by the courts 
of such state, such construction is presumed to be adopted along with the 
provision. McGrew v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 231 Mo. 4g6, 132 S. W. 1077 • 
. The Colorado provision is very similar to the one adopted in Oregon. 
However, it does not expressly state that it is intended to be self-executing, 
nor does it make reference to :future legislation as indicating tpat it was 
not presumed to be self-executing. It provides the percentage of voters 
necessary to propose a measure, to whom the petition should· be addressed, 
the time previous to election within which it must be filed, and that a ma-
jority vote is sufficient to enact the petition into law. It appears that the 
court has construed this to be self-executing by upholding a constitutional 
amendment which was initiated and passed by force of this constitutional 
provision. The court stated: "Whenever-a constitutional amendment is at-
tacked because of alleged violation of the Constitution in its submission, it 
mtl!;t appear beyond a reasonable doubt, both as to law and fact, that the 
Constitutio~ has •been violated before the amendment would be overthrown." 
People v. Prevost, 55 Colo. 199, 134 Pac. 129. 
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The provisions in the constitutions of Nevada, California, South· Dakota, 
and New Mexico will need no attention in this connection, as the former 
two state expressly that they are intended to be self-eJtecuting, while the lat• 
ter two clearly indicate that they were'not expected to be self-executing. 
As previously stated, North Dakota bas provided for the initiative and 
referendum upon general legislation by a constitutional amendment which 
had affirmatively provid'ed that the same was to be self-executing. This pro-
vision was proposed and P,assed by the 19n legislature and again passed by 
the I9I3 legislature (Senate bitt No. 32, chapter IOI, 19I3 Session Laws), 
and having been ratified by a vote of the peopl~. it became incorporated as 
a part of the constitution. The constitutional provision construed in the 
case of State v. Hall, supra, granted the privilege of amending the constitu-
tion through initiative petition. This constitutional amendment .was adopted 
through much the·· same procedure as that followed in changing the consti-
tution so as to· permit the initiative and referendum upon general legislatio.n. 
It was introduced and passed by the 19n legislature (Senate Bill I53, chapter 
89, Session Laws I9II), and having been ratified by a vote of the people, 
this provision permitting the constitution to be amended through initiative 
petition jiad now become a part of th~ state constitution (§202) •. A petition 
fulfitling the requisites so far as set forth in the constitutional amendment 
was now filed with the Secretary of State which sought to amend §215 of 
the state constitution so as to remove t.he capitol from Bismarck to New 
Rockford. Relators insisted that the petition was void, inasmuch as the 
constitutional amendment under which petitie>rters were proceeding was 
not setf;executing and no supplemental legislation had been passed there-
under to put the same into effect. Therefore, they sought to enjoin the 
Secretary of State from submitting the question contained in the petition 
to a vote of the people. That part of the constitutional amendment which 
bore upon the question of whether or not the same was self-executing (sub-
division 2, -§202) read as follo~s : 
"Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may also ~e pro-
posed by the people by the filing with the Secretary of State, at least six 
months previous to a general election, of an initiative petition containing the 
signatures of at least twenty-five per cent of the legal voters in each of not 
less than one-half of the counties of the state. When such petition has been 
properly filed, the proposed amendment or a~endments shall be published 
as the Legislature may provide, for three months previous to the general 
election, and shatl be placed upon the ballot to be voted upon by the people 
at the next general election." 
The court construed the phrase "as the Legislature may provide" to be 
indicative of future legislatie>n as to the manner of publishing the proposed 
amendment, but inasmuch as there was a general provision in force as to 
the manner in which proposed constitutional amendments should be given pub-
licity (§979 of Political Code of 19I3) it was argued that this phrase, "as 
the Legislature may provide," referred to the method already in use for ad-
vertising proposed constitutional amendments. Surely the omission to state 
expressly the manner of publication would not have in itself defeated the 
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self-execution of the amendment. The court, not finding it evident from an 
examination of the amendment itself.that the same was self-executing or the 
contrary, proceeded to determine the question from the intention of the 
framers, and to determine that intention a resort to extrinsic matters was 
found necessary. .Fuss v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256. 
It was disco"'.ered that the wording of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was taken from the section bearing on the same subject in the Oregon 
constitution, the similarity of the language employed indicating that one was 
patterned after the other. However, the North Dakota legislature failed to 
adopt the last clause of the Oregon provision, "Petitions ·and orders for the 
initiative and referendum shall be filed with the Secretary of State, and 
in submitting the same to the people he, and all other officers, shall 1be. guided 
by the general laws and the act submitting this amendment until legislation 
is especially provided for." As the Oregon courts, previous to the adoption 
by North Dakota of the former state's constitutional provision on the ques-
tion of amendment of constitution by initiative petition, had decided: that 
the insertion of this particular clause determined the constitutional amend-
ment to be self-executing (Stevens v. Benson, supra), then it would seem, 
from the fact that the North Dakota. legislature had in its adoption· eliminated 
this .clause, that the legislature did not intend that the amendment which 
it was framing was to be considered self-executing. McG-rew v. Mo-. Pde. 
R. Co., 230 Mo. 4g6, 132 S. W. 1077 \,Fitzmaurice v. Willis, ~ N. D. 372, 127 
N. W. 95; Commonwealth v. Harnett, 3 Gray (Mass.) 450; Pen11ock v. Dia-
logue, 2 Pet. 1;7 L. Ed. 327; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. ;182, 12 L."Ed. 505, 
Inasmuch as the court will .look to the words of the constitutional amend-
ment itself for a determination of whether or not the same is 13elf-executing, 
why would it not be wise for the Legislature to insert in every such pro-
vision some clause indicating the intent? "This section shall be self-execut-
. ing," or, if 'it is thought necessary, add, "but legislation may be enacted espe-
cially to facilitate. its operation." On the other Jiand, .if it is the intention· 
that the amendment should not be construed as self-executing, let a clause 
be inserted which would clearly irtd unequivocally state that the same was 
not self-executing, or plainly indicate that it was to be considered only as 
a mandate to succeeding legislatures,-"The Legislature shall make suitable 
provisions for carryi11g into eff~ct the provisions of this amendment." Let 
some express provision be inserted wherever there is the slightest" possibility 
of the question arising. Those who frame the law can best state whether or 
not it" is intended to be full and complete in itself, or merely an outline of 
a general policy for the guidance of future legislation. To neglect to insert 
sonie such clause will often give rise to the necessity of a judicial determina-
tion of the question,_:a possibility which may not occur to the framer of 
the amendment because of his own familiarity with its intention. Not only 
ai:~ cost and _delay saved, but also the disappointment of those who have re-
lie'd1· on a construction of the provision opposite to that determined upon 
~·~~ ~L~ 
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WH~N Is DEATH INSTANTANJWUS ?-The existence, side by side, in the 
same jurisdiction at the same time of the two .statutes which have come to 
be generally known as the "DEATH ACT!' (modelled after LoRD CAYPBi::r.r.'s 
Ac::r), and the "SURVIVAL Ac::r," has led to many curious twists and turns of 
the law and has resulted in a decided co.nflict of authority as to their proper 
interpretation. It would almost seem· as if the cases were in conflict upon 
every point upon which there could possibly be a difference of opinion. It 
is even difficult to reconcile some of the cases d'ecided by the same court. 
For the different interpretations which have been given these statutes and 
the resulting conflict in authority see 15'HARV. L. lh:v. 854, 14 MICH. L. IU:V. 
4o8, and for a full discussion of the Michigan cases an article on "CoNsnuc-
'.rION OF 'SURVIVAL ACT! AND 'DEATH ACT! IN MICHIGAN'' in 9 MICH. L. lh:v. 
205. . 
Upon one poinf·the cases are fairly well agreed, that when aeath is "in-
'stantaneous" there can be but one recovery and that under the "DEATH ACT." 
Therefore, as pointed out in the note in 14 MICH. L. lh:v. 4o8, the question 
whether or not death is "instantaneous" is a vital one, and out of the de-
cisions on that point there has sprung one of the most serious conflicts of 
the whole question, viz: when is death instantaneous? ·The iriquiiy in this 
note will concern only that particular phase of the general question. · 
In the recent case of Great Northern. Railway Co. v. Capital Trust Co., 
Adms., 37 Sup. Ct. 41, the Supreme Court of the UJ,tited States was called 
upon to pass upon the point under discussion. An employee of the rail-
way company was accidentally. killed and suit was brought under the Federal 
EMPLOn:R's LIABILITY,AC'l' for the benefit of his father and mother seeking 
to recover their pecuniary loss and also damages suffered by him prior to 
·his death. Some evidence tended to show that after bemg run o:ver by one 
or more cars, although wholly unconscious, the deceased continued to breathe 
for perhaps ten minutes. .Testimony of other witnesses suppoi:ted a claim 
that there was no appreciable continuation of life. The court held that death 
1
was instantaneous and that the circumstances afforded no. basis for an esti-
mation or award of damages in addition -to the •beneficiaries' pecuniary loss., 
1n a former case, St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 
Sup. Ct. 704. 59 L. Ed. u6o, the Supreme Court held that as the decendent 
had· survived his injuries more than a half hour, the injuries being such· as 
to cause him extreme pain and suffering if he remained conscious, the ad-
ministrator might recover the .beneficiary's pecuniary loss and also for the 
pain and suffering endured by the deceased. That is, death was not in-
stantaneous, and a cause of action had vested in the injured· employee which 
survived to his personal representative. In that case the rule· was stated as 
follows : "Such pain and suffering as are substantially contemporaneous with 
death or mere incidents to it, as also the short periods of insensibility which 
sometimes intervene between fatal injuries and death, afford no basis for a 
separate estimatioq or award of damages under statutes like that which is 
controlling here." The facts in Great Northern. Ry. Co. v. Capital Trust Co., 
supra, were deemed to bring it squarely within the rule as laid down in 
St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Craft. Therefore we may safely say that we have 
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a fairly, definite workable rule for guidance , in future cases arising under 
the federal statute. 
In Michigan the cases are confusing and fail to give a definite and certain 
test as to when death is instantaneous. See 9 MrcH. L. Rsv. 205, 214 In 
Olivier v. St.' Ry. Co., 134 Mich. 367, g6 N. W. 434 104 Am. St. Rep. 6o7, 
3 Ann. Cas. 53, the court said : "There is no occasion for saying that one 
dies instantly, because such survival is accompanied by a comatose condition, 
or unconsciousness, or insanity or idiocy," and cited Keilow v. Railway Co., 
68 Iowa 470, "where it was held that survival of the injury for a moment is 
sufficient to permit the cause of action to vest and survive.". 'However, in 
the case of West v. Detroit United Railway Co., 159 Mich. 26g, 123 N. W. 
i101, where decedent was struck by a street car, carried under the car and 
crushed, and was heard to groan for about fifteen minutes after the accident, 
though he was dead when taken from beneath the car, the court held that 
death was instantaneous and laid down the following rule : ''Where there 
is i continuing injury resulting in death within a few ·moments, it is 'in-
stantaneous'." Fo11owing this came the case of Ely v. D. U. R., 162 Mich. 
287, where the deceased· was struck on the: head by a trolley· pole and lived 
about ten minutes, though never recovering consciousness, and it was held 
that the action was properly• brought under the "SURVIVAr, Ac:r." A still 
later Michigan case is Lobenstein v. Whitehead & Kales Iron Co., 179 Mich. 
279, ·146 N. W. 293. In that case the deceased fell down a flue in a building 
under construction, and never recovered consciousness after he struck, al-
though there were some signs of life about the body fifteen minutes after 
the fall, and it was held that death was instantaneous. For the latest Michi-
gan case on the question see Beach v. St. l oseph, 158 N. W. 1045. This. 
brief review of the Michigan cases alone serves to illustrate the confusion 
in the authorities and the inherent difficulties of the problem. 
The results in other jurisdictions are equally as unsatisfactory. In Moyer 
v. Oshkosh, 151 Wis. 586, 139 N. W. 378, the decedent while riding a bicycle 
fell through an open draw in ~ bridge and was, drowned. Death was held: 
to be instantaneous, the court at the same time saying that the proper test is: 
"Was there a substantial period of conscious suffering between the injury and 
the death?" But evidently the court determined that there is no .conscious 
suffering in death by drowning. It would al.most seem as if our common 
knowledge would show this to be untrue, for it would be rare indeed where 
the first contact with the water would result in instant death or unconscious-
ness. On the: contrary, would it not be more in accord with the circum-
stances 'generally accompanying such tragedies to say that while the deceased 
was ·struggling in the water and drowning there was a substantial period of 
conscious suffering? But see The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335; Clieatham v. Red 
River Line, 56 Fed. 248. In Klann v. Minn, 161 Wis. 517, 154 N. W. 9¢; in 
applying the rule the same court came to the conclusion that there was a 
su~stantial pe!icid of conscious suffering where the decedent was caught and 
burlied in a building in which he was working. In other word·s, the court 
has decided that while the first flame which reached the deceased would not 
cause instant death or unconsciousness, nevertheless such would be the re-
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sult from the first contact of the water in case of death by drowning. See 
also Perkins v. 0.xford Paper Co., 104 Me. 109, 71 Atl. 476, where the same 
rule is applied. · 
In Massachusetts we find still another variation of the rule. There the 
accruing right of action to the person injured and· which will survive to his 
personal representative does not depend upon intelligence, consciousness, or 
mental capacity of any kind upon the part of the person injured. Holle~ 
beck v. Berkshire R. Co., 9 Cush. ~ass.) 478. In the earlier case of Kearney 
v. Bost01i & W.R. Co., 9 Cush. lo8, it had been held ~Y Chief Justice SHAW 
that where "there was only a momentary, spasmodic struggle" death was in-
stantaneous. · See also Norton v. Sewall, lo6 Mass, 143; 8 Am. Rep. 298; 
Mears v. Bosto1i & M. R. Co., 163 Mass. 150, 39 N. E. 997.· In a later Mas-
sachusetts case (Martin v. Boston & M. R. Co., 175 Mass. 502, 56 N. E. 719) 
where a brakeman· in· descending from a train caught his foot. fell,' and was 
dragged over two hundred feet before he was finally killed, the' court heid 
that there was no conscious suffering and so death was instantaneous. In 
St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Stamps, &i Ark. 241, 104 S. W. II4, the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas on facts which indicated much more clearly that death 
had been instant reached an exactly opposite conclusion. The Massachusetts 
rule was applied in·the principal case under discussion, Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Capital Trust Co., supra, when it was before the Supreme 'Court of 
Minnesota (reported in 127 Minn. I44. 149 N. W. 14), and a different con-
clusion reached from that by the Supreme Court of the United States, viz:. 
that death had been instantaneous. , . . , 
Perhaps the rule announced by the Supreme Court will ·do much to Clarify 
a problem which has been so troublesome. It will at least furnish a moreo 
definite test for solving these perplexing situations than any of the rules 
hitherto announced. • M. C. M. 
